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Abstract 
The demographic profile of a region is usually seen as a slowly changing background 
phenomenon in the analysis of regional competitiveness and regional growth. 
However, regional demographic change can have a significant impact on regional 
competitiveness and such change is often more rapid and profound than at the national 
level. In turn, regional population size, growth, composition and distribution are 
endogenous to regional economic development. This paper focuses on the impact of 
population ageing and immigration on aspects of regional competitiveness such as 
innovation, entrepreneurship and productivity. Immigration and ageing trends have 
generated huge separate literatures but it is argued here that it is fruitful to consider 
these trends jointly. Theoretically, there are many channels through which 
immigration and population ageing can affect regional competitiveness. There is 
empirical evidence that population ageing reduces regional competitiveness, while 
immigration – particularly of entrepreneurs and highly skilled workers to metropolitan 
areas – enhances competitiveness. Much of the available literature is based on small-
scale case studies and rigorous econometric research on the impact of demographic 
change at the regional level is still remarkably rare. Some directions for further 
research are suggested. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two demographic phenomena have been attracting increasing attention in recent 
years throughout the world. One of these is the growth in international migration, 
leading to a doubling of the number of people living outside their country of birth 
since 1960, to close to 200 million at present (e.g. United Nations 2006). The other is 
the increase in the number and the proportion of older people in the population in 
many developed countries, due to below replacement fertility, increasing life 
expectancy and a post World War II baby boom generation commencing to reach 
retirement ages (e.g. Lee 2003). The latter trend is commonly referred to as 
population ageing, although the term age-structural transition would be more 
appropriate (Pool 2005).  
 Generally, these trends are seen as long-term demographic forces that operate 
in the background of the national economy and for which there may be a relatively 
long time frame of anticipation and policy response, even if there remains debate 
about appropriate policy measures. 1  Certainly, there is some consensus in the 
literature that the impact of immigration on income per head, unemployment rates and 
other economic indicators in receiving countries may be rather modest at the macro 
level (e.g., Poot and Cochrane 2005). The difficult economic issues are primarily 
those of distribution of the impact. While the aggregate net economic impact may be 
small, there may be losers (such as low skilled native born workers in host countries) 
and winners (such as owners of capital in host countries and the migrants themselves). 
Similarly, one major economic issue in population ageing is again one of distribution, 
namely the viability of transfer of income from those who are active in the labour 
market to those who are not. In this context, however, there is also concern about 
population ageing leading to lower productivity growth and lesser flexibility in the 
labour market. Other economic issues include the rising health care costs and the 
appropriate health insurance system. 
 At a smaller spatial scale, there is considerable diversity in the extent of 
demographic change and in the issues. Economic performance may have at this level 
a much stronger link with population size/scale, density, growth and composition, 
although the causality certainly goes both ways: from economic performance to 
demographic characteristics and vice versa (e.g., Poot 2005). While population 
growth of developed countries nowadays rarely exceeds more than a fraction of 1 
percent per annum (and has commenced to decline in countries such as Japan and 
Germany), the population of cities and regions may grow much faster or, instead, 
decline fairly rapidly.  
 In such regional population change, migration (internal and international) and 
population ageing are closely linked. Migrants tend to be relatively young (because 
migration has the greatest economic return to the young), leading to ageing 
populations in sending regions and more youthful ones in receiving regions. Where 
youthfulness creates economic dynamism that has both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits to inward migrants, a positive feedback loop is created that contributes, for 
example, to rural depopulation. 
 In interesting example is the case of Japan recently reported in The Economist 
(2006). The population of Japan is expected to decline from 128 million to 100 
                                                 
1 A simple argument is that one trend can offset the other: given the typical age profile of migrants, 
immigration can slow down ageing. However, in the long-run this is demographically ineffective 
unless immigrants have above replacement fertility. Moreover, the level of immigration required to 
offset ageing in many cases unrealistically high (see e.g. Holzmann 2005 on the European case).   
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million over the next half century due to population ageing. In rural areas the change 
will be even more pronounced, as young people continue to move out. Small rural 
communities, such as The Economist’s example of Ogama along the Sea of Japan may 
vanish completely. Other peripheral populations, such as the city of Yubari (on the 
northern island of Hokkaido) which declined from more than 100,0000 to 13,000 
people, attempt to resort to tourism promotion or the sale of lifestyle blocks of land to 
ex-urbanites to stop further decline. Overall, some 7 million baby boomers are 
expected to retire in 2007 alone and the number is increasing further in the following 
years. These trends are by no means unique to Japan. 
 This paper focuses on how immigration and population ageing could affect 
regional competitiveness. The concept of competitiveness at the regional level is open 
to different interpretations (see Gardiner et al. 2004), but the focus is here on a range 
of factors that can enhance regional economic outcomes, such as entrepreneurship, 
innovation, the availability of human capital and total factor productivity. These may 
be thought off collectively as enhancing ‘regional competitiveness’ (see e.g. Poot 
2000).   
The next section briefly reviews the conventional macroeconomic perspective 
on population growth and national or regional economic growth. Section 3 then 
considers the potential impact of immigration on regional competitiveness. Section 4 
focuses on the impact of the changing age structure. In both cases, the distinction is 
made between macro level and micro level empirical evidence. It will be concluded 
that both in the migration literature and the literature on the impact of ageing on 
productivity, that there are a number of theoretically opposite effects on regional 
competitiveness, so that the assessment of any overall impact will be an empirical 
matter. In this respect, particularly research on the relationship between innovation 
and demographic change is still in its infancy. The final section sums up and provides 
some suggestions for further research. 
 
 
2. Endogenous population and endogenous regional competitiveness 
 
One of the difficulties in assessing the impact of demographic change on regional 
competitiveness is that the causality runs both ways, as noted in the introduction. 
Population change affects regional economic outcomes and at the same time the 
fundamental demographic forces of fertility, mortality and migration are all affected 
by economic conditions. There is, however, asymmetry in empirical evidence. On the 
one hand, the economic determinants of demographic behaviour have been well-
researched and there is a rather large body of empirical evidence regarding the 
important role played by such economic effects vis-à-vis often harder to quantify 
social, political and institutional forces (e.g. Rosenzweig and Stark 1997). On the 
other hand, while standard theories of economic growth are often conclusive 
regarding the impact of demographic change, this causal link is empirically more 
difficult to establish due to myriad other economic influences on regional growth and 
competitiveness that may ‘swamp’ the impact of changing demographic conditions. 
Let us consider both directions of this two-way interaction in turn, starting 
with the impact of regional competitiveness on population. Firstly, when regional 
competitiveness is high and buoyant economic conditions result in high income, this 
will induce lower fertility. The key mechanisms through which this occurs are 
increases in female post-compulsory education (in response to higher returns to 
education), higher female wage rates (which increases the time cost of child rearing) 
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and increasing female labour force participation. Low fertility will induce population 
ageing in the growing region in the long-run, but buoyant economic conditions will 
lead in the short term to net inward migration that generates a more youthful age 
structure.  
A higher level of regional income is also instrumental in increasing life 
expectancy and encouraging better health care. A positive correlation between income 
and life expectancy is well established, although the causality runs again both ways 
(Bloom and Canning 2000). Zhang and Zhang (2005) find that increasing longevity 
reduces fertility and raises the rate of economic growth. There appears to be no limit 
yet to the potential for further increases in life expectancy (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). 
Furthermore, highly competitive regions attract more migrants internally and, 
when permitted, internationally. With respect to the latter, there is a clustering of 
immigrants in metropolitan areas and to specific areas within such cities (see e.g. 
Gorter et al. 1998). This is consistent with the notion of the city as the engine of 
economic growth (e.g. Jacobs 1984). Migrant clustering can be a self-reinforcing 
process, even though over time there is spatial dispersion of any given cohort of 
immigrants. Card and Lewis (2005) found, for example, that Mexican immigrants in 
the United States are now much more dispersed than two decades ago due to internal 
migration of migrants initially settling in Los Angeles and due to “new cities” 
increasingly becoming the first destination of Mexican migrants.  
Turning to the theories of the impact of population change on economic 
growth, immigration and population ageing do not feature of course explicitly in the 
conventional Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model for a closed economy. In that 
model population growth is an exogenous parameter that affects the steady-state 
capital intensity but not the exogenous rate of long-run economic growth. For given 
savings behaviour, higher population growth then implies a lower capital intensity and 
therefore lower income per capita. In a spatial setting in which migration is in the 
“right” direction but faces significant barriers or in which people continue to have 
home country attachment, differences in population growth can lead to persistent 
differences in income or even divergence (e.g., Nijkamp and Poot 1998; Larramona 
and Sanso 2006). In open economy growth models, such as the Braun model of 
perfect capital mobility and imperfect labour mobility in a small open economy, 
higher immigration speeds up convergence to the long-run steady state growth rate 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, section 9.1.3).2 However, taking into account that 
migration is a selective process (with the more able and educated more likely to 
migrate) and affects education decisions, spatial convergence is by no means 
guaranteed (e.g., Kanbur and Rapoport 2005).  
Because there have been, and continue to be, significant barriers to 
international migration, as well as capital not necessarily flowing in the ‘right’ 
direction, it is not surprising that cross-country growth regressions have tended to find 
a negative impact of population growth on economic growth (e.g., Birdsall et al. 
2001). Besides the diminishing returns to the capital needed for the larger population 
and the presence of resource constraints, other factors responsible for the negative 
effect of population growth on economic growth are lower labour force participation 
due to higher fertility, higher demographic dependency and lower saving rates. Recent 
econometric research suggests that demographic change can play a major role in 
explaining cross-country growth differences (Kelley and Schmidt 2005).  
                                                 
2 For a survey of recent endogenous growth models with immigration, see Levine et al. (2003). 
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At the regional level, however, inward migration may lead to higher labour 
force participation and higher levels of investment. Consequently, a negative effect of 
population growth on regional economic growth is then less obvious and the reverse 
causation will be stronger: regional economic growth will induce population growth.  
Traditional non-spatial growth theories adopt the assumption of constant 
returns to scale so that the scale of population is irrelevant to the growth path. In 
contrast, endogenous growth models often have an increasing returns technology in 
which population scale can positively affect the long-run growth rate. The greater 
scale may also be due to greater integration of different areas (see, e.g., Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer 1991). Population growth itself can be endogenous in this context, as 
endogenous fertility can lead the scale of the economy to grow over time while 
increasing returns translates this increase in scale into rising per capita income (Jones 
1995). The presence of endogenous fertility in endogenous growth models can create 
multiple equilibria in which high growth and low growth paths are both feasible and 
the actual outcome depends on initial conditions (e.g. Becker et al. 1990).  
As in non-spatial growth models, population growth has also often been 
assumed exogenous in spatial growth models (e.g., Black and Henderson 1999), but 
this would be inconsistent with observed patterns of population redistribution, human 
capital investments and agglomeration externalities that lead to increasing 
urbanisation and growing urban/rural differences (see, e.g., Fujita and Thisse 2002). 
Of course, positive feedback loop processes of increasing agglomeration can 
eventually turn around when agglomeration diseconomies such as increasing scarcity 
of land, congestion, pollution, social exclusion and crime start to encourage outward 
migration.  
When looking at the empirical evidence of the effect of population on 
economic growth, the huge cross-country growth regressions literature may have 
some relevance for the regional issue as well. Firstly, population size appears to be an 
insignificant determinant and population growth has a statistically significant negative 
affect, as noted earlier. At the country level, empirical research suggests that a small 
population it in itself no impediment to high income (e.g. Armstrong and Reid 2004). 
Of more importance, however, is the issue of geographic location. Remoteness 
continues to have a negative impact on economic performance, despite cheaper travel 
and communication technologies having led to what some call a “death of distance” 
(e.g. Poot 2004). The positive effect of agglomeration is reflected in a positive 
relationship between economic growth and population density. The combined effect 
of these trends is a growing spatial polarisation: rising relative levels of income in 
globally connected metropolitan cities, with a relative decline of peripheral regions. 
At the same time, intra-metropolitan income inequality is increasing too. 
As noted earlier, immigrants are particularly attracted to faster growing 
metropolitan areas. This begs the question to what extent they are simply attracted to 
the fruits of metropolitan competitiveness, or whether their presence makes an 
additional contribution to entrepreneurship and productivity growth. This will be 
considered in the next section. 
 
 
3. Effects of immigration on regional competitiveness 
 
The economic impact of immigration is complex and has many dimensions. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1, reproduced from a recent Australian report (Productivity 
Commission 2006). Despite the growing importance of immigration as a contributor 
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to national and regional population change, remarkably little is known about its 
impact on regional competitiveness and productivity. Broadly speaking, high levels of 
immigration coincide with higher economic growth and with agglomeration, but such 
association is no proof of causation. There are three channels through which 
immigration can improve competitiveness and productivity. These are (1) acceleration 
of productivity improvements associated with new investment induced by 
immigration, including possible scale effects; (2) through increasing innovation and 
entrepreneurship; and (3) through improving allocative efficiency. Let us consider 
each of these in turn.3 
 
 
Fig. 1 An overview of the economic impacts of migration 
Source: Productivity Commission (2006) 
 
Firstly, growth in the labour force through immigration raises the return to capital. 
This encourages investment until eventually the risk-adjusted rate of return is again 
spatially equalised. To the extent that the additional investment embodies the latest 
technologies, immigration can enhance total factor productivity. This effect is 
dependent, however, on the sectoral allocation of the additional investment. Given the 
growth in the number of households, increased residential building activity is very 
likely (Poot et al. 1988; Saiz 2003). However, this type of investment is likely to have 
                                                 
3 This section has benefited from comments from Steven Stillman. 
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less technological spillover benefits than fixed capital formation in, say, high-tech 
sectors. To assess whether immigration benefits the latter, an econometric shift-share 
analysis of sectoral change following an immigration ‘wave’ would be needed. 
 The second way that immigration can enhance competitiveness is through 
Schumpeterian innovation. This occurs when immigrants bring new ideas, work in 
‘sunrise’ industries and occupations, or set up new businesses. Immigrants may have 
higher rates of self-employment and may be less risk averse than the locally born 
population. The growing international mobility of professionals that may be referred 
to as a “brain exchange” or “talent flow” is also likely to contribute to 
competitiveness of destination regions. It can furthermore be argued that growing 
social or ethnic diversity due to immigration encourages innovation and 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbach 2004), although the effect on growth 
is by no means easy to detect (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). A counterargument is 
that diversity creates a less cohesive society that may, through eroding social capital 
and trust, reduce competitiveness.  
The third way that immigration can affect economic growth is through 
improving economic efficiency. It can be argued that migrants are more responsive to 
economic signals because of a lack of 'cumulative inertia' and thus help keep the 
economy moving. The fact that migrants are younger, on average, also tends to make 
them more willing and able to adjust to economic change. Immigration also increases 
the size of the regional economy, which can potentially lead to more competition and 
efficiency.  
To the extent that immigration is controlled by government agencies, and 
therefore at least partially exogenous, the overall impact of the effects mentioned 
above should be detectable in time series modelling of total factor productivity (TFP). 
However, the impact of immigration on productivity has been inadequately researched 
throughout the world. Poot (1993) provided some very tentative New Zealand 
evidence that there is only a weak effect of immigration causing productivity 
improvements (using the concept of Granger causality), but a much stronger effect of 
net migration responding positively at times when TFP growth is faster than usual.  
 An additional knowledge gap exists at the micro-level: evidence of the 
transmission mechanisms through which immigrants increase productivity of 
individual firms: through ‘working and trying harder’ or through passing on their own 
skills to the locally born, or through their entrepreneurial activities. The absence of 
conclusive evidence is the more remarkable given that immigration policy is often 
motivated by these as yet not well quantified spillover benefits in terms 
competitiveness and productivity. There are many micro-level studies of migrant 
entrepreneurship, but such studies are often of a qualitative nature and based on very 
small samples. Such studies do suggest that there are significant qualitative 
differences in terms of entrepreneurial activity between migrants groups defined by 
ethnicity or birthplace. There is some evidence that informal networks are crucial for 
business success (see e.g. Masurel et al. 2002). 
 In some countries, particularly those that recruit entrepreneurial migrants 
through the “points-based admission system’ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), 
there is a need to distinguish between active and passive investment: spillover benefits 
are likely to be less if migrant financial capital is invested in the existing capital stock 
rather than used as start-up capital for new enterprises. 
Little empirical evidence exists on how immigration affects regional 
productivity growth. This is not surprising given the difficulty to disentangle a 
number of effects. Firstly, immigration is itself endogenous and disproportionally in 
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the direction of fast growing cities. Secondly, immigration makes the labour force 
more youthful, so that age and diversity effects must be considered separately. Thirdly, 
the impact in the long-run may be different from that in the short-run. Quispe-Agnoli 
and Zavodny (2002) found that in the U.S. labour productivity increased more slowly 
in states that attracted a larger share of immigrants during the 1980s, but argued that 
this might be a short-run rather than long-run effect.  
 Two additional effects through which international migration can indirectly 
affect regional competitiveness are through trade and through international linkages 
that result from a country’s diaspora remaining in touch with their country and region 
of birth. With respect to trade, several recent studies have found that immigration has 
a positive effect on trade between the source country of the immigrants and the host 
country.4 Two basic causes for this effect have been identified. Firstly, immigrants 
tend to have a preference for the products from their home countries, as a matter of 
taste or due to emotional attachment. Secondly, immigrants can reduce transaction 
costs of bilateral trade with their home countries either through individual 
characteristics such as business contacts or through more generic traits such as 
language. 
 While the positive correlation between immigration and trade has been 
generally confirmed, it is important to distinguish the effect on imports from the effect 
on exports. By and large, the elasticity of the effect of immigration on exports is less 
than the elasticity of the effect on imports. A good example is the study by Wagner et 
al. (2002). Using cross-provincial variation in immigration in Canada, these authors 
find that immigrants expand exports to their native country, but also stimulate imports 
from this country. The Canadian data suggest that the effect on imports may be triple 
that on exports. Other research, similarly suggests that immigration leads to 
deterioration of the trade balance (see, e.g. Ching and Chen 2000). These effects are 
likely to vary with the characteristics of the migrants and their countries of birth.  
 The evidence on a deteriorating trade balance following an immigration wave 
is consistent with the expectation that immigration-induced population growth 
generates excess demand. If this is just a short-run effect, it may not be of great 
concern. More important are the dynamic gains from increased trade. When growth in 
trade encourages innovation and entrepreneurship in the sectors in which the migrants 
are employed, competitiveness may increase in the long run. 
The emphasis in this section has been on an inflow of foreign born workers. 
However, in areas with low or middle income levels, the main driver of population 
change may be emigration. Moreover, regions with large levels of immigration 
sometimes experience also large levels of emigration. Such emigration is a 
combination of outward migration of natives and return or onward migration of earlier 
immigrants. The potential role of the diaspora in economic development is attracting 
increasing attention in middle income countries. The diaspora phenomenon is clearly 
linked with global economic integration and the growing mobility of professional and 
other skilled workers. In the global market for ‘talent’, such links can be exploited for 
development (see e.g. Cervantes and Guellec 2002 and Henoch 2006 for reviews). A 
recent example is that of how Russia’s diaspora contribute to a competitive edge in 
the software industry (Bardhan and Kroll 2006). 
There are various ways in which regions can benefit from diaspora. The first is 
through encouraging return migration by means of special tax treatment or training 
and investment subsidies. Governments can also develop diaspora knowledge 
                                                 
4 References can be found in Poot and Cochrane (2005). 
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networks through promoting business associations or virtual clusters through the 
internet. There can also be integration of home and host regions through joint ventures 
and other forms of cooperation. Finally, incentives may be created to channel 
remittances to productive investment in the home region. 
It has been noted that, for good economic reasons, the propensity to cross 
borders is much higher among young workers rather than older workers. 
Consequently, net inward migration of young workers can reduce ageing of the 
population in sub-replacement fertility regions. 5  However, as noted earlier, 
immigration cannot permanently halt population ageing, unless migrants have above-
replacement fertility. The literature suggests that, with rising incomes, immigrant 
fertility may drop to that of the host population.6 The next section reviews the benefits 
of youthfulness of a population with respect to innovation, competitiveness and 
growth. 
 
 
4. Effects of population ageing on regional competitiveness 
 
Population ageing can refer to either an increasing share of older persons in the 
population (structural ageing), or an increase in the number of older persons 
(numerical ageing), or both. Population ageing has received widespread attention 
throughout the developed world in recent years as many countries are experiencing 
below replacement fertility, while life expectancy continues to increase. In addition, 
there will be a retirement bulge over the next two decades due to the retirement of 
large cohorts of post-WWII baby boomers. This peristalsis effect will generate very 
rapid increases in the number of ‘old old’ towards the middle of the century. To cite 
The Economist  (2004) “..a larger generation of old folk than ever before will need 
support for longer than ever before from a population of working age that is shrinking 
continuously….”.  However, population ageing is also affecting emerging and less 
developed economies. For example, the population of Asia – while still younger than 
the West at present – will age faster than the West (e.g., Mason et al. 2006). The case 
of China, given its huge population, rapid development and low fertility, is likely to 
have an impact globally (e.g. Eberstadt 2004). 
Like immigration, population ageing affects the economy also in many ways, 
see for example Hurd (1997) for a review of microeconomic issues while Weil (1997) 
provides a macroeconomic review. This literature tends to emphasise public policy 
problems associated with population ageing. More recent literature downplays such 
problems and takes a more optimistic stance of ‘positive ageing’ through policy 
responses and market forces that will encourage older persons to continue to make 
economic contributions that will avoid or overcome many problem. In addition, 
resources that were allocated to the young are freed up in many countries and generate 
a (temporary) phase of an increasing proportion of the population at the key labour 
                                                 
5 Population ageing is also leading in many developed countries to particular regions growing rapidly 
through retirement migration. Such migrants are of course primarily attracted to amenities such as a 
pleasant climate, natural attractions and recreational facilities. This type of migration shifts the sectoral 
structure to labour-intensive services of eldercare. However, specialisation in these types of services 
may impede a region’s long-run competitiveness if the services are primarily non-traded and they 
generate a demand for lesser skilled workers. Interestingly, it is increasingly argued that one benefit of 
immigration is specifically to meet this increasing demand for eldercare workers (e.g., Easton 2006). 
6 For example, Smith and Edmonston (1997, chapter 3) note that fertility differences exist between 
immigrants in the US and the native-born population, but that the differences diminish with later 
generations. 
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force ages. This provides a so-called ‘demographic dividend’ (e.g., Lee 2003) 
although this dividend requires investment in education and training of the workers in 
order to reap the benefits of this ‘window of opportunity’ (Pool 2005).  
This section briefly reviews both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic 
links between population ageing and competitiveness.7 The effect of population aging 
on labour productivity is theoretically indeterminate (Cutler et al. 1990). Disney 
(1996) for instance, argues that an increasingly mature workforce will have higher 
levels of work experience and therefore might be expected to achieve higher levels of 
productivity than a younger workforce. Furthermore, as the aggregate cost of 
schooling falls when there are fewer young people, more intensive training of the 
young becomes affordable and may lead to subsequent productivity growth (Ermisch 
1995, p 333; Fougere and Merette 1999). 
 It is also possible that the slower labour force growth implied by an ageing 
population leads to a higher relative price of labour and therefore provides a greater 
incentive to innovate through capital investment or research and development (e.g., 
Romer 1990). However, there are also endogenous growth models in which lower 
population growth results in less human capital accumulation and therefore a lower 
growth rate of labour productivity (e.g, Steinman et al. 1998). Moreover, if population 
ageing is associated with high levels of dissaving, this may increase the cost of capital 
and lower investment.8 Furthermore, since labour mobility (geographic, occupational, 
industrial, or job to job) is inversely related to age, population ageing may also lower 
productivity growth through slowing down structural adjustment in the economy. In 
addition, population ageing shifts demand in the economy to labour-intensive services 
where the potential for productivity growth may be less (van Groezen et al. 2005). 
Finally, Canton et al. (2002) argue that when older people face a higher cost of 
adopting new technologies, political pressure in a democratic system may slow down 
innovation adoption in an ageing society.  
 Some empirical evidence is now emerging on the overall impact of all these 
effects. At the cross-country level, Lindh and Malmberg (1999) find that the 50-64 
age group had a positive influence on labour productivity growth, whereas the 65 plus 
group had a negative effect and other age groups ambiguous effects. Using Canadian 
provincial data, Tang and MacLeod (2006) find that older workers are, on average, 
less productive than younger workers and that labour force ageing has a modest 
negative impact on productivity growth. Similarly, Brunow and Hirte (2006) find that 
differences in age structure induce differences in per capita output growth across 
European regions. The most significant (positive) growth is generated by the age 
group of 30 to 44 year old. Using a large panel of developed and developing countries, 
Feyrer (2005) found that it was the relative size of the age group 40 and 49 that 
particularly associated with productivity growth. 
What could be micro-level physiological phenomena that underpin such 
productivity effects? Robertson and Tracy (1998) provide a review of the literature on 
age, health and work and show that there are many factors that affect the productivity 
of older workers. There is evidence that older workers remain highly productive 
within a field that they know well and where long experience is beneficial. However, 
when they perform work where they are required to reorient themselves to new task 
                                                 
7 An extensive review of both the macro and micro literature on the impact of population ageing on 
innovation and productivity growth can be found in Prskawetz et al. (2005). 
8 This effect is likely to be more pronounced in relatively closed imperfect capital markets. There is 
little evidence of a global shortage of capital and demographically driven upward pressure on global 
interest rates at present. 
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requirements and to solve novel problems, their performance is below that of younger 
workers (Smith 1996). This effect appears to be compounded by work task 
complexity. This means that as task complexity increases, mental agility becomes 
more important and this compounds the age-induced productivity effect (Myerson et 
al. 1990). This can become particularly problematic as the rapid pace of technological 
change increases the importance of being able to assimilate new techniques and adapt 
to new ways of working (Skirbekk 2003, pp. 7-8). However, there appears to be a ‘use 
it’ or ‘lose it’ dynamic for some skills, such as literacy skills. Workers who are 
employed in environments that require continual learning are less susceptible to a 
decline in their ability to acquire new skills (OECD 1998, p. 138). This implies that 
any tendency for the ability to acquire new skills to decline with age can, at least in 
part, be ameliorated by continued training. With respect the impact of individual 
ageing on creativity and entrepreneurship, psychologists argue that there is as yet little 
known on this and there is particularly in this area a need for substantive longitudinal 
studies (e.g. Simonton 2000). 
The potential impact of population ageing on innovation can be gauged from 
interesting recent research by Jones (2005), who studied the age at which individuals 
make their greatest intellectual contribution, using data on Nobel Prize winners and 
great inventors. Jones finds that the age at which the mind is most innovate increased 
by about 6 years over the 20th Century. The main reason is that the ‘researcher 
training period’ appears to have become longer. The later age of peak intellectual 
productivity does not lead to a shift in productivity beyond early middle age. This 
implies that individual innovators are productive over a narrower span of their life 
cycle and Jones estimates that individual life cycle innovation potential has declined 
by 30 percent. For a given population size, this would of course reduce the aggregate 
output of innovators.9 This study is complemented by a wide range of contributions 
by economists (using e.g. evidence from supervisors’ ratings or piece rate samples) 
and by psychologists on cognitive abilities, that do detect declining individual 
productivity after mid-life (e.g., Prskawetz et al. 2005). 
However, the consequences of population ageing due to these effects may not 
be as grim as the above suggests. It can be argued that the fewer innovations that are 
produced at higher age are more likely to be the result of reduced incentives to 
innovate at such ages than a physiological diminished ability for intellectual creativity. 
Introducing incentives to innovate at older age (e.g. through flat organisational 
structures in which older persons are not disproportionally required to take on 
managerial responsibilities), the regional impact of the change in average individual 
innovativeness can become negligible. In any case, innovation is closely linked to 
agglomeration and economic scale, not average innovativeness per firm or knowledge 
worker. This suggests that agglomeration effects (possibly reinforced by globalisation 
and immigration) may offset the impact of work force ageing on innovation. 
The physiological consequences of aging are of course not limited to the 
cognitive but can manifest themselves also in the greater propensity for illness and 
injury at older ages that could affect an individual worker’s output, increases the cost 
of employing older persons, or that could induce a worker to withdraw from the work 
force earlier than otherwise. There is evidence, however, that the impact of ill health 
on productivity has been declining over time (Manton et al. 1997). This process will 
                                                 
9 An obvious solution to this problem would be to remove institutional barriers to later retirement. The 
benefits of this for the life course output of leading researchers are even further enhanced by the fact 
that reaching the status of Nobel prize winner appears to itself lead to increasing life expectancy 
(Rablen and Oswald 2007). 
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also be assisted by the large shift of the work force from physical and injury-prone 
employment to white collar employment (OECD, 1998). 
 When current incentives for early retirement in many developed nations are 
removed, the productivity of older workers can be effectively enhanced by further 
human capital investments. Skills acquisition by older workers raises a number of 
issues. Given that the working life left to an older worker is shorter than that left to a 
younger worker there is a shorter time period in which the older worker can employ 
their newly acquired skills and, for the cognitive reasons suggested above, it maybe 
more time consuming, and thus costly to impart new skills to older workers. This 
creates clear incentives to concentrate training and skill development in the early part 
of a worker’s career (OECD 1998, p 129). Set against this is the lower job mobility of 
older workers (Dixon 2003, p 71). As employers assess the profitability of investment 
in training not in terms of the employee’s remaining working life but in terms of their 
expected remaining tenure with the firm, it may prove that the lower quit rate of older 
workers will increase the rate of return on training investment compared to younger 
workers. The rapidity of technical change will also impact on the employers’ 
calculation of the likely period over which the cost of training will be amortized. 
Hence if the skills workers have devalued rapidly because of technological change, 
the importance of a long ‘pay back period’ for investment in training would diminish, 
relatively favouring older workers. Conversely if there is indeed a deterioration of the 
ability to acquire new skills with age, rapidly changing skills needs would 
disadvantage older workers. 
 
 
5. Final comments 
 
This paper focused on two current demographic trends common to many developed 
economies: population ageing and increasing immigration. The paper considered the 
impact of these two phenomena on regional competitiveness at both the macro and 
micro levels. The review drew on two strands of literature that developed largely 
independently but show remarkable similarity. Both with respect to population ageing 
and with respect to immigration, there are many channels through which these 
demographic trends can affect regional competitiveness. These were briefly reviewed 
in the paper. There is empirical evidence that population ageing reduces regional 
competitiveness, while immigration – particularly of entrepreneurs and highly skilled 
workers to metropolitan areas – enhances competitiveness.  
 Such findings add weight to the suggestion that increased immigration may be 
the policy solution to offset the economic impact of ageing. Certainly, population 
pyramids in developing countries bulge precisely at the younger age groups where the 
numbers in the developed countries are declining. Moreover, as noted earlier, ageing 
may generate an increase in certain types of services that can be met by immigrant 
workers. In addition, immigrants might take the housing vacated by retiring workers 
moving out of dormitory suburbs and thereby avoid a collapse of house prices (Myers 
2007). However, while immigration can slow down ageing, the levels needed to halt 
this are unrealistically high and, moreover, when such level are not sustained, ageing 
may even accelerate subsequently. In any case, it is unlikely that immigration will 
provide the solution to population decline in all regions that currently face rapid 
ageing and net outward migration. While a managed contraction of activity is 
politically not as attractive to sell to constituents as a growth strategy, the “mindset” 
for policy formulation may need to move away from the “importance in numbers” and 
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there is no doubt that some regions cannot avoid planning for decline (e.g. Stimson 
2002). The main concern will be to generate productivity growth and real income 
gains in these situations, while using the available resources in a sustainable way.  
In this respect, much of the available literature on the impact of immigration 
and ageing on productivity and competitiveness is based on small-scale case studies 
and rigorous econometric studies of the impact of demographic change at the regional 
level are still remarkably absent.  
 At the macro-level, there is an urgent need for time series analysis of the 
potential link between immigration waves and total factor productivity growth. At the 
regional level, there is also a need to study the link between dynamic benefits of 
agglomeration and immigrant clustering in agglomerations. It would be particularly 
interesting to assess whether immigrants are concentrated in industries that have high 
levels of innovation and rates of total factor productivity growth. However, given the 
endogeneity of the spatial distribution of migrants, the search for suitable instrumental 
variables in spatial econometric modelling of the link between immigration and 
regional competitiveness would be a first requirement. 
 At the micro-level, the Schumpeterian effects of immigration in terms of 
benefits for innovation and entrepreneurship also still warrant further attention. Much 
of the existing literature is based on small scale qualitative studies. Another 
potentially fruitful endeavour of inquiry is the difference between regions in terms of 
the extent to which there are existing links with their diaspora, or the extent to which 
such links could be developed in the future.  
 With respect to population ageing, it appears that the negative impact of 
population ageing on regional competitiveness may be relatively small as long as 
policies are in place for productivity enhancement of the older work force. What is 
needed, therefore, is a careful assessment of the barriers to re(training) of older 
workers and the barriers to their job, geographic, occupational and industrial labour 
mobility. 
With respect to such barriers, population ageing and immigration have an 
additional feature in common that has not been addressed in the present paper. This is 
the existence of discrimination in the labour market, which may for example be 
reflected in relatively high unemployment rates among older workers and certain 
immigrant groups. Economic theory suggests that in a competitive environment 
discrimination is not sustainable. However, due to asymmetric information and other 
labour market imperfections, discrimination against older workers and against 
immigrant workers may persist (see e.g. Cain 1986 for a classic survey). It is clear 
that such discrimination can potentially be an impediment to regional competitiveness. 
The impact of discrimination of older workers and migrants groups on regional 
innovation and entrepreneurship appears a largely unexplored research topic, as well 
as an issue to be addressed by regional policy makers. 
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